Abstract
Abstract
In this paper I explore graded attributions of blameworthiness—that is, judgments of the general sort, “A is more blameworthy for x-ing than B is,” or “A is less blameworthy for her character than B is.” In so doing, I aim to provide a philosophical basis for the widespread, if not completely articulate, practice of altering the degree to which we hold others responsible on the basis of facts about them or facts about their environments. To vindicate this practice, I disambiguate several related properties and identify the properties of being more (and less) blameworthy for an action (or for one’s character) with a complex set of relations between (i) what an agent deserves for her action and (ii) how good it is from the point of view of desert that she receives that response.
Publisher
University of Illinois Press
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