RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT

Abstract

Abstract Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright distinguish between justification and entitlement. For both entitlement is the new notion. For Burge, entitlement is warrant without reasons. Burge’s account of reasons is explained. For Wright, entitlement is a non-evidential right to claim knowledge of authenticity-conditions. Wright’s account is motivated by warrant transmission failure. Burge and Wright mean different things by entitlement; they do not share a common project. Burge’s use connects to mainstream epistemological inquiry into knowledge and warrant. Wright’s use connects to mainstream epistemology inquiry into skepticism and warrant transmission. Recent work from and about both is discussed. Among other results, it is shown that Burge’s distinction is not a version of the internalism vs. externalism distinction. For Burge, both justifications and entitlements are externalist.