Affiliation:
1. Fraunhofer FKIE, Cyber Analysis & Defense, Fraunhoferstraße 20, 53343 Wachtberg, Germany
2. Institute of Computer Science 4, University of Bonn, Friedrich-Hirzebruch-Allee 8, 53115 Bonn, Germany
Abstract
Today’s maritime transportation relies on global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) for accurate navigation. The high-precision GNSS receivers on board modern vessels are often considered trustworthy. However, due to technological advances and malicious activities, this assumption is no longer always true. Numerous incidents of tampered GNSS signals have been reported. Furthermore, researchers have demonstrated that manipulations can be carried out even with inexpensive hardware and little expert knowledge, lowering the barrier for malicious attacks with far-reaching consequences. Hence, exclusive trust in GNSS is misplaced, and methods for reliable detection are urgently needed. However, many of the proposed solutions require expensive replacement of existing hardware. In this paper, therefore, we present MAritime Nmea-based Anomaly detection (MANA), a novel low-cost framework for GPS spoofing detection. MANA monitors NMEA-0183 data and advantageously combines several software-based methods. Using simulations supported by real-world experiments that generate an extensive dataset, we investigate our approach and finally evaluate its effectiveness.
Funder
German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action
Subject
Ocean Engineering,Water Science and Technology,Civil and Structural Engineering
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