Supervisory Strategies for Overage Construction Workers: Considering the Contractor’s Risk Perception

Abstract

Overage construction workers have received widespread attention due to the higher safety risk. The balance of interests among the contractor, supervisor, and regulator forms a game, whose dynamics are tightly linked to the contractor’s risk perception. This study aims to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model with risk perception integrated, thus proposing tailored supervisory strategies for supervisors and regulators. Unlike the traditional scale-based approach, a behavior-based method is developed to measure the contractor’s risk perception, which improves the interpretability of results and avoids complex questionnaire surveys. The simulation results reveal a clear correlation between the contractor’s risk perception and behavior. It is recommended that supervisors increase penalties and the initial possibility of Rigorous Inspection properly, and regulators may consider enhancing credit-based future returns and losses. Notably, certain measures may not be applicable to all contractors. Hence, supervisors and regulators should identify their risk perception before adopting supervisory strategies.