Affiliation:
1. Allen Discovery Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA
2. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920, USA
3. Adjunct Faculty, Department of Mathematics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
Abstract
The ideas of self-observation and self-representation, and the concomitant idea of self-control, pervade both the cognitive and life sciences, arising in domains as diverse as immunology and robotics. Here, we ask in a very general way whether, and to what extent, these ideas make sense. Using a generic model of physical interactions, we prove a theorem and several corollaries that severely restrict applicable notions of self-observation, self-representation, and self-control. We show, in particular, that adding observational, representational, or control capabilities to a meta-level component of a system cannot, even in principle, lead to a complete meta-level representation of the system as a whole. We conclude that self-representation can at best be heuristic, and that self models cannot, in general, be empirically tested by the systems that implement them.
Funder
John Templeton Foundation
Air Force Office of Scientific Research
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