BRT: An Efficient and Scalable Blockchain-Based Revocation Transparency System for TLS Connections
Author:
Xing Qianqian1ORCID, Wang Xiaofeng1, Xu Xinyue1, Lin Jiaqi2ORCID, Wang Fei1, Li Cui1, Wang Baosheng1
Affiliation:
1. College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China 2. Institute of System Engineering AMS PLA, Beijing 100039, China
Abstract
Log-based public key infrastructure(PKI) refers to a robust class of CA-attack-resilient PKI that enhance transparency and accountability in the certificate revocation and issuance process by compelling certificate authorities (CAs) to submit revocations to publicly and verifiably accessible logs. However, log-based PKIs suffer from a reliance on centralized and consistent sources of information, rendering them susceptible to split-world attacks, and they regrettably fail to provide adequate incentives for recording or monitoring CA behavior. Blockchain-based PKIs address these limitations by enabling decentralized log audits through automated financial incentives. However, they continue to face challenges in developing a scalable revocation mechanism suited for lightweight clients. In this paper, we introduce BRT, a scalable blockchain-based system for certificate and revocation transparency. It serves to log, audit, and validate the status of certificates within the transport layer security (TLS)/secure sockets layer(SSL) PKI domain. We designed an audit-on-chain framework, coupled with an off-chain storage/computation system, to enhance the efficiency of BRT when operating in a blockchain environment. By implementing a blockchain-based prototype, we demonstrate that BRT achieves storage-efficient log recording with a peak compression rate reaching 8%, cost-effective log updates for large-scale certificates, and near-instantaneous revocation checks for users.
Funder
National Key R&D Program of China National Natural Science Foundation of China
Subject
Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Biochemistry,Instrumentation,Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics,Analytical Chemistry
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