High-Speed Railway Opening and Corporate Fraud

Abstract

The impact of high-speed railway (HSR) on corporate behavior has recently attracted both practical and theoretical interest. In this paper, based on a sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 in China, we use a difference-in-difference model to explore the impact of HSR openings on corporate fraud and analyze its mechanism. We find that HSR introduction has several important implications. First, it reduces the tendency and frequency of corporate fraud. Second, HSR opening restrains corporate fraud by improving the external supervision level and reducing the financing constraints of the company. Third, the inhibitory effect of the HSR opening on corporate fraud is significant when the market competition is less intense, and the company’s internal control level is poor. Fourth, after distinguishing types of fraud, HSR opening can still significantly inhibit information disclosure fraud and manager fraud, but not operation fraud. These results indicate that HSR openings promote the flow of information and labor across regions, alleviating the information asymmetry of firms. Our findings are conducive to improving the governance environment of the listed companies, which provides new clues for discovering and restricting corporate fraud.