Tournament Incentive Mechanisms Design for Long-Distance Water Diversion Projects Incorporating Preference Heterogeneity-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Tournament Incentive Mechanisms Design for Long-Distance Water Diversion Projects Incorporating Preference Heterogeneity

Published:2022-06 Issue:6 Volume:148 Page:
ISSN:0733-9364
Container-title:Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

Author:

Lv Lelin¹^ORCID,Wang Zhuofu²,Li Huimin³^ORCID,Zhang Chengyi⁴^ORCID,Qiao Ran⁵

Affiliation:

1. Ph.D. Candidate, Business School, Hohai Univ., Nanjing 211100, China. ORCID: .

2. Professor, Business School, Hohai Univ., Nanjing 211100, China.

3. Associate Professor, Dept. of Construction Engineering and Management, North China Univ. of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450045, China (corresponding author). ORCID: .

4. Professor, Dept. of Civil and Architectural Engineering, Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071. ORCID: .

5. Ph.D. Candidate, Business School, Hohai Univ., Nanjing 211100, China.

Publisher

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

Subject

Strategy and Management,Industrial relations,Building and Construction,Civil and Structural Engineering

Link

https://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0002284

Reference54 articles.

1. Do tournament incentives motivate chief executive officers to be socially responsible?;Ali S.;Manage. Audit. J.,2020

2. Compensation mechanism for urban water environment treatment PPP project in China

3. Tournament compensation systems, employee heterogeneity, and firm performance;Backes-Gellner U.;Hum. Resour. Manage.,2013

4. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History

5. Collusion in public procurement: The role of subcontracting;Cesi B.;Econ. Polit.,2020

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5. Erratum for “Tournament Incentive Mechanisms Design for Long-Distance Water Diversion Projects Incorporating Preference Heterogeneity” by Lelin Lv, Zhuofu Wang, Huimin Li, Chengyi Zhang, and Ran Qiao;Journal of Construction Engineering and Management;2022-09