Optimum Outcome-Sharing Construction Contracts with Multiagent and Multioutcome Arrangements-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

登录注册会员服务联系我们

Optimum Outcome-Sharing Construction Contracts with Multiagent and Multioutcome Arrangements

Published:2020-07 Issue:7 Volume:146 Page:04020067
ISSN:0733-9364
Container-title:Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

Author:

Hosseinian S. Mahdi¹,Farahpour Elham²,Carmichael David G.³^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Assistant Professor, School of Engineering, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Univ. of Bu-Ali Sina, Hamedan 65178-38695, Iran (corresponding author).

2. School of Engineering, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Univ. of Bu-Ali Sina, Hamedan 65178-38695, Iran.

3. Professor, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. ORCID: .

Publisher

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

Subject

Strategy and Management,Industrial relations,Building and Construction,Civil and Structural Engineering

Link

http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/%28ASCE%29CO.1943-7862.0001862

Reference47 articles.

1. The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields

2. Total quality management in the construction process

3. The selection of sharing ratios in target cost contracts

4. Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting

Cited by 15 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESOURCE-SHARING PLATFORM CONSIDERING REPUTATION EFFECTS FOR MEGAPROJECTS;International Journal of Strategic Property Management;2024-06-12

2. Procurement contract design for distributed photovoltaic project considering output risk under asymmetric production effort information;Kybernetes;2024-05-13

3. Optimal Sharing of Construction Project Outcomes with Downstream Contracting Parties: Principal–Agent Analysis;Journal of Construction Engineering and Management;2024-02

4. Incentives of an Experimental Resource-Sharing Digital Platform for Megaprojects;2024

5. Developing incentive mechanisms for long-term and short-term technological innovation in major engineering projects using principal-agent theory;Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management;2023-11-15

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线，采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统，可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容，当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种，收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇，并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询！咨询电话：010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号京ICP备18003416号-3