Abstract
Michal Pruski and Richard C. Playford argue that if partial ectogenesis technology becomes available then it would undermine Judith Jarvis Thomson’s defense of abortion. Thomson argues that even if a fetus has a right to life, this is not a positive right to be given whatever one needs to survive; it is not a right to use the mother’s body or to risk her life without her permission. Pruski and Playford argue that when the risks involved in ectogenesis are comparable to those of abortion, then minimal decency requires gestational mothers to opt for ectogenesis over abortion. This argument hinges on egregious misunderstandings of (1) ectogenesis technology, (2) medical and surgical abortion, and (3) medical consent.
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