A growing literature has documented a negative association between analytical thinking style and belief in God. However, the replicability, magnitude, and theoretical importance of this correlation has recently been debated. Moreover, the existing literature has not examined distinct psychological accounts of this relationship. In Study 1, we (1) tested the replicability of the correlation and assessed its magnitude in a large sample (N = 5284; comprising of undergraduate students at a Canadian university, and broader samples of Canadians, Americans and Indians); and (2) tested three distinct theoretical accounts of how cognitive style might come to be related to a diverse set of religious beliefs including belief in God, in karma, and in witchcraft. The first, the dual process model, posits that analytical thinking is inversely related to belief in God and in other supernatural entities. The second, the expressive rationality model, posits that analytical thinking is specifically recruited in supporting already-held beliefs in an identity-protective manner. And the third, the counter-normativity rationality model, posits that analytical thinking is recruited to question beliefs supported by prevailing cultural norms. We tested specific predictions derived from these models regarding the association between analytic thinking and religious beliefs in a Bayesian framework. In Study 2, we tested the replicability of our results in a re-analysis of previously-published data. We conclude that whereas the counter-normativity rationality model was contradicted by the data, both the dual process and expressive rationality models received limited empirical support.