Abstract
Intuitively, it is wrong to kill even to prevent two other people from killing. Consequentialists have argued that reflection on such moral restrictions engenders an air of paradox: how can it be morally wrong to lie or kill if by doing so I prevent more lyings and killings? The air of paradox arises because the persisting intuitive appeal of such restrictions is called into question by the attempt to explain their deep intuitive appeal. The threat of paradox can be dissipated by demonstrating either that the intuitive appeal of such restrictions dissipates on reflection, or by showing that there is after all a plausible theoretical explanation for them. Both consequentialists and their opponents have recently offered theoretical explanations supporting such restrictions. Consequentialist strategies propose either shifting the focal point of evaluations away from actions to rules or motives, or refining the standpoints from which the outcomes to be promoted are ranked. Their critics argue that there are perfectly good, nonparadoxical explanations of such restrictions through appeal to value, but that such explanations are elided from view by the assumption, built into the case for paradox, that any such appeal to the value must be an appeal to the value of outcomes to be promoted. Reject the consequentialist's outcome‐centered constraint on value, they argue, and plausible explanations are readily available for why it is much worse to violate such a restriction even though the outcome of doing so would in some sense be better.