Abstract
Philosophers often seek to defend the credentials of one set of disputed claims by comparing them to other claims with which they are said to have important features in common. Some arguments of this kind have a “companions in guilt” form. Companions in guilt arguments are designed to defend the credentials of one set of claims, A, by showing that some of the features of A‐claims that are thought to be problematic are either shared or implied by another set of claims, B, the credentials of which are less problematic. With respect to these features, A‐claims and B‐claims are said to be companions in guilt. In other words, if the credentials of A‐claims are undermined by possessing these features, then so are the credentials of B‐claims, all other things being equal. On the assumption that the credentials of B‐claims are not undermined by the fact that they possess these features, then neither are the credentials of A‐claims.