Adding mirror clauses within the European Green Deal: Hype or hope?

Abstract

AbstractThe proposed reductions in farm input uses foreseen in the European Green Deal may penalize European farm production while increasing environmental leakages to foreign countries where production may expand. These expected impacts have led to calls for a more restrictive trade policy based on mirror clauses. This paper considers as a case study a potential ban on glyphosate in vegetable and fruits production. We develop an original computable general equilibrium model with endogenous adoption of new European production standards by foreign producers on currently latent markets. We find in our case study that adding mirror clauses to the Green Deal marginally improves European farm income and the global environmental footprint of food. We find that foreign producers as a whole can gain from these clauses and not lose as in a standard analysis. European households support these clauses by paying higher food bills while consuming vegetables and fruits produced without glyphosate.