Affiliation:
1. CONCEPT, University of Cologne Cologne Germany
2. Centre for Philosophy of Memory IPhiG, Université Grenoble Alpes Saint‐Martin‐d'Heres France
3. Institut Universitaire de France France
Abstract
AbstractThe idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy.This article is categorized under:
Philosophy > Psychological Capacities
Philosophy > Consciousness
Psychology > Memory
Subject
General Psychology,General Medicine,General Neuroscience