Effects of presidential elections on accounting conservatism: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract

AbstractThis study examines the effects of presidential elections (PEs) on firms’ accounting conservatism in Korea. The Korean president exerts great influence on the government's financial, monetary, subsidiary, and regulatory policies. At the same time, however, the Korean constitution prohibits the re‐election of the incumbent president. This simultaneously strong and fragile presidential system creates unique political uncertainty, which deteriorates the information gap between firms’ insiders and outsiders. According to the efficient contracting channel, accounting conservatism is expected to relieve information asymmetry by recognizing the economic losses faster than economic gains. But we posit that the effectiveness of accounting conservatism depends on the information environment within which they operate. If the information environment facilitates a compensation system for an increase in accounting conservatism under high uncertainty, managers may prefer to expand conservative accounting practices. However, if there is no such incentive mechanism, managers may opt to suspend accounting conservatism because the cost of revealing bad news increases during periods of uncertainty. Test results show that PEs encourage managers to delay rather than expedite the timely recognition of economic losses. This negative effect becomes more pronounced in firms with higher reliance on government contracts than firms with lower such reliance. We also find that Korean chaebol‐affiliated firms are likely to increase accounting conservatism during PEs. In general, US‐based studies support the positive relationship between information asymmetry and accounting conservatism, while this study demonstrates that this relationship can be reverse depending on the institutional environment.