Does the fellow‐villager relationship between the independent director and the chairman of the board can inhibit the major shareholder expropriation? Evidence from China-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Does the fellow‐villager relationship between the independent director and the chairman of the board can inhibit the major shareholder expropriation? Evidence from China

Published:2021-06-04 Issue:6 Volume:42 Page:1374-1393
ISSN:0143-6570
Container-title:Managerial and Decision Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Manage Decis Econ

Author:

Yu Yike¹²³,Cao Danting⁴,Wang Zuogong¹⁵,Zhang Zaijie¹³

Affiliation:

1. Green Development Strategy Institute of Western China Guizhou University of Finance and Economics Guiyang China

2. School of Business Administration Guizhou University of Finance and Economics Guiyang China

3. Guizhou High End Think Tank of Green Development Guiyang China

4. School of Economics and Management Yuzhang Normal University Nanchang China

5. Guizhou Inclusive Finance Research Institute Guizhou University of Finance and Economics Guiyang China

Funder

National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Business and International Management

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/mde.3301

Reference76 articles.

1. A Theory of Friendly Boards

2. The role of institutional development in the prevalence and performance of entrepreneur and family-controlled firms

3. Un "village du Zheijang" à Paris ?

4. The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending

5. Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

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