Affiliation:
1. German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
2. University of Hamburg
3. University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne
4. Collége de France
5. Paris‐Panthéon‐Assas University
6. Mondes arabes
7. Lower Saxony Memorials Foundation
Abstract
The Iraq War of 2003–11 has been described as a conflict over the meaning of Europe and between the conflicting goals of cementing the transatlantic relationship with the United States and advancing a more independent, "Carolingian" vision of the continent on the world stage.
This article employs the analytical lens of foreign policy role conceptions, drawing from French and German policy literature, newly available archival evidence, and interviews with more than 20 diplomats, politicians, and civil servants active during the 2003 invasion. We argue that the war
itself and the agency of Iraqis played a limited role in European powers' jockeying for position, which was instead determined by these countries' relationships with the US and the role of the United Nations. This was the case even for France and Germany, which had extensive interest in Iraq
in the decades preceding the invasion. If the Iraq War was one over the meaning of Europe, the debate around and the execution of the invasion highlighted the continued importance of a US-led NATO for defining such meaning.