Computational Extensive-Form Games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Computational Extensive-Form Games

Published:2016-07-21 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Halpern Joseph Y.¹,Pass Rafael¹,Seeman Lior²

Affiliation:

1. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

2. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Funder

Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Army Research Office

Google

National Science Foundation

Microsoft

Simons Foundation

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2940716.2940733

Reference15 articles.

1. O. Goldreich. 2001. Foundations of Cryptography Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. O. Goldreich. 2001. Foundations of Cryptography Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.

2. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. 1984. Probabilistic encryption. 28 2 (1984) 270--299. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. 1984. Probabilistic encryption. 28 2 (1984) 270--299.

3. Sequential rationality in cryptographic protocols

4. J. Y. Halpern R. Pass and D. Reichman. 2015. On the nonexistence of equilibrium in computational games. (2015). J. Y. Halpern R. Pass and D. Reichman. 2015. On the nonexistence of equilibrium in computational games. (2015).

Cited by 6 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Finite State Machines Play Extensive-Form Games;Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2020-07-09

2. Generic Superlight Client for Permissionless Blockchains;Computer Security – ESORICS 2020;2020

3. Distributed Protocols for Leader Election;ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation;2019-02-23

4. On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Resource-Bounded Players;Algorithmic Game Theory;2019

5. Outsourcing Computation: The Minimal Refereed Mechanism;Web and Internet Economics;2019