Abstract
Current global economic challenges have stimulated public demand for coordinated activities at a transnational level (as evidenced by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis). In this context, academic discourse and the forums of various multilateral organizations have invoked the concept of global public goods (GPGs). This paper explores the practical realization of the GPGs concept within the global structures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), assessing the extent to which the wealth of services provided by the Fund may actually be considered GPGs. Approaching the subject from a theoretical perspective, the paper draws on analytical evaluations of relevant documents and IMF data sources, as well as empirical findings derived from semi-structured in-depth interviews (IDI) with representatives of international organizations (including the IMF) in Washington, DC. The findings suggest that the IMF provides a diverse array of products supportive of international financial stability (particularly ‘best-shot public goods’), and may therefore be regarded as exemplifying the GPGs concept. During times of relative global economic stability, IMF expenditure shifts toward technical support and monitoring, placing the organization in a role more akin to a provider of pure public goods. However, despite the IMF enjoying a number of competitive advantages (and resources) that would seem to preordain a role as a major GPGs provider, the GPGs concept is only marginally evoked in the organization’s publications and activities. Moreover, certain elements of the IMF’s model of operation drastically reduce the organization’s current operating capability as a GPGs provider.
Publisher
Uniwersytet Lodzki (University of Lodz)
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