Abstract
In bilateral logic formulas are signed by + and -, indicating the speech acts assertion and denial. I argue that making an assumption is also speech act. Speech acts cannot be embedded within other speech acts. Hence we cannot make sense of the notion of making an assumption in bilateral logic. Some attempts at a solution to this problem are considered and rejected.
Funder
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
Publisher
Uniwersytet Lodzki (University of Lodz)
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