Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise

Abstract

AbstractRationaleResearch on diagnostic reasoning has been conducted for fifty years or more. There is growing consensus that there are two distinct processes involved in human diagnostic reasoning: System 1, a rapid retrieval of possible diagnostic hypotheses, largely automatic and based to a large part on experiential knowledge, and System 2, a slower, analytical, conscious application of formal knowledge to arrive at a diagnostic conclusion. However, within this broad framework, controversy and disagreement abound. In particular, many authors have suggested that the root cause of diagnostic errors is cognitive biases originating in System 1 and propose that educating learners about the types of cognitive biases and their impact on diagnosis would have a major influence on error reduction.Aims and ObjectivesIn the present paper, we take issue with these claims.MethodWe reviewed the literature to examine the extent to which this theoretical model is supported by the evidence.ResultsWe show that evidence derived from fundamental research in human cognition and studies in clinical medicine challenges the basic assumptions of this theory—that errors arise in System 1 processing as a consequence of cognitive biases, and are corrected by slow, deliberative analytical processing. We claim that, to the contrary, errors derive from both System 1 and System 2 reasoning, that they arise from lack of access to the appropriate knowledge, not from errors of processing, and that the two processes are not essential to the process of diagnostic reasoning.ConclusionsThe two processing modes are better understood as a consequence of the nature of the knowledge retrieved, not as independent processes.