Corporatism or Industrial Democracy?

Abstract

This paper examines the political and organizational presuppositions of industrial policy-making. Empirical evidence about the structure of government-industry relations shows that fears of an authoritarian corporate state are unfounded, and that the institutional conditions described in neo-corporatist analyses of industrial policy-making do not exist, at the national level, or in most sectors of British industry. Organizations and interorganizational relations have evolved piecemeal and not as components of a system of economic management. The British economy is undermanaged rather than overmanaged. Moreover, organizational weaknesses represent a major deficiency because structural changes in the pattern of economic activity are urgently needed. A series of political economy models is presented and used to specify the characteristics of structural problems on the supply side of the economy, and the institutions needed to resolve them. It is proposed that, in order to deal with recurring structural problems, effective and democratic policy processes for the macro management of supply are required.