ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES FOR MODEL ROBUSTNESS-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES FOR MODEL ROBUSTNESS

Published:2010-05 Issue:2 Volume:57 Page:212-237
ISSN:0036-9292
Container-title:Scottish Journal of Political Economy
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Dai Meixing,Spyromitros Eleftherios

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2010.00514.x/fullpdf

Reference33 articles.

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2. Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts;Chortareas;Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,2002

3. Central banker contracts, incomplete information, and monetary policy surprises;Chortareas;Public Choice,2003

4. The science of monetary policy;Clarida;Journal of Economic Literature,1999

5. Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?;Cukierman;The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,2002

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4. Central bank transparency under the cost channel;International Finance;2017-06

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