Affiliation:
1. School of Business Renmin University of China Beijing China
2. School of International Trade and Economics University of International Business and Economics Beijing China
Abstract
AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.Research Findings/InsightsIn a hand‐collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside‐promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,General Business, Management and Accounting
Cited by
3 articles.
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