Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking

Published:2020-07-16 Issue:3 Volume:15 Page:909-932
ISSN:1748-5983
Container-title:Regulation & Governance
language:en
Short-container-title:Regulation & Governance

Author:

Wansleben Leon¹^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Cologne Germany

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Law,Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/rego.12330

Reference148 articles.

1. Central Banking And The Triumph Of Technical Rationality

2. Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

3. Financial Intermediaries, Financial Stability, and Monetary Policy

4. Liquidity and leverage

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