Firms and Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union

Abstract

AbstractOur understanding of the role of firms in the making of European Union (EU) trade policy remains partial. This article contributes to expanding this literature by investigating under what conditions we observe more firm‐centric lobbying, compared to business associational lobbying, in EU trade policy. We advance the arguments that firm‐centric political lobbying in EU trade policy‐making is a function of both industry and country‐level characteristics. Relying on an original dataset of lobbying contacts with the EU Trade Commissioner, his or her cabinet members and the Director‐General between 2014 and 2018, we find that the likelihood of firm‐centric lobbying increases in (1) EU industries displaying high levels of multinational corporations' activity, global sourcing of intermediates and product differentiation and (2) countries characterized as liberal market economies. Besides showing that firm‐centric models of trade travel well in the EU context, we contribute to advancing the understanding of how domestic political institutions affect the politics of trade.