Recentralization and the long‐lasting effect of campaign‐style enforcement: From the perspective of authority allocation

Abstract

AbstractThis paper discusses whether the effect of campaign‐style enforcement can surpass the short term from the perspective of authority allocation. Based on the theory of authority allocation, we establish an explanatory framework for the impact of authority allocation on the effect of campaign‐style enforcement. We argue that, through authority allocation, the central government has both formal authority and real authority, which helps to extend the effect of campaign‐style enforcement beyond the short term. We empirically studied the regulatory compliance in China's environmental administrative talk from 2014 to 2016. Statistical findings supported by robustness checks confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Further analysis shows that campaign‐style enforcement can be more effective when local officials have longer tenure, higher levels of education, or older age. Our paper shows that authority recentralization on specific issues can bridge the conflict of policy goals between central and local governments, prolonging the effect of campaign‐style enforcement.