Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote: A Marxist-progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

登录注册会员服务联系我们

Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote: A Marxist-progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment

Published:2013-09 Issue:5 Volume:76 Page:791-816
ISSN:0026-7961
Container-title:The Modern Law Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Mod. L. Rev.

Author:

Talbot Lorraine

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Law

Link

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/1468-2230.12036/fullpdf

Reference141 articles.

1. EU Commission Green Paper Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration polices 2010

2. http://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/11-4035%20EFAMA%20ECG_final_6%20April%202011%20v2.pdf 2012

3. L. A. Bebchuk The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power 2005 118 HLR 835

Cited by 24 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Investor personhood: the case against paternalism and welfarism in corporate law;Journal of Corporate Law Studies;2024-07-18

2. Role of Institutional Investment Intermediaries in Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis;Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental;2024-02-23

3. ANONİM ŞİRKETLERDE METAVERSE ORTAMINDA GENEL KURUL TOPLANTISI YAPILMASI;Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi;2022-11-26

4. Construction and Implementation of Marxist Learning Platform in New Media Environment;Journal of Environmental and Public Health;2022-09-01

5. The ends and means of banking: the Royal Bank of Scotland after the 2008 crisis;Journal of Corporate Law Studies;2022-07-03

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线，采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统，可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容，当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种，收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇，并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询！咨询电话：010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP