Coping with an unreliable supplier: An option contract with a backup supplier

Abstract

AbstractThis study considers a channel with a retailer who satisfies demand by ordering from two suppliers: a low‐cost primary supplier whose production is subject to failure and an expensive reliable backup supplier. We develop a call option contract and evaluate the preference of each party through two negotiable scenarios: (i) the backup supplier only decides on option price and (ii) the backup supplier determines both option and exercise prices. We find that higher authority and flexibility of the backup supplier in making decisions in the second scenario results in a lower option price, yet more possibility of achieving channel coordination compared with the first scenario. While the backup supplier prefers the second scenario, the retailer would rather adopt the other one. The results also shed light on when/how the call option contract can be beneficial for each participant. Specifically, when the primary supplier is unable to supply the whole demand, the proposed option contract can be a win‐win Pareto‐improving profit‐sharing mechanism only if the likelihood of failure in the primary supplier's production is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the backup supplier may be a detrimental option for the retailer.