Auctions with signaling concerns-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Auctions with signaling concerns

Published:2020-11-23 Issue:2 Volume:30 Page:420-448
ISSN:1058-6407
Container-title:Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
language:en
Short-container-title:J Econ Manage Strat

Author:

Bos Olivier¹²³^ORCID,Truyts Tom⁴⁵

Affiliation:

1. LEMMA Panthéon‐Assas University Paris France

2. Institut Universitaire de France (IUF) Paris France

3. ZEW ‐ Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Mannheim Germany

4. CEREC Saint‐Louis University‐Brussels Brussels Belgium

5. Center for Economic Studies University of Leuven Leuven Belgium

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics,General Business, Management and Accounting,General Medicine

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jems.12406

Reference38 articles.

1. Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions

2. Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

3. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

4. Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?

5. Bos O. &Pollrich M.(2020). Optimal auctions with signaling bidders. Mimeo.

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1. Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences;Journal of Economic Theory;2024-03

2. Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort;Journal of Mathematical Economics;2023-08

3. Entry in first-price auctions with signaling;International Journal of Game Theory;2022-12-02

4. Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders;PLOS ONE;2022-10-14

5. Patent intermediaries: Between the technology market and the intellectual property market;Revue d'économie industrielle;2022-10-01