Breaking the bank: Personal financial interests of Supreme Court justices and institutional legitimacy

Abstract

AbstractObjectiveWe study the relationship between lack of recusals by Supreme Court justices in cases where they have a direct or indirect personal financial interest and diffuse support for the Court. Justices should recuse when they have a personal stake in a case; otherwise, decisions are perceived as biased and violating the rule of law. Despite popular interest in this behavior and significant consequences for societal acquiescence, there are no empirical studies assessing this relationship.MethodsWe construct a survey experiment with four conditions and a control. Each condition displays an article discussing the failure of different justices to recuse from a case involving a direct (stocks owned in the litigant party) or an indirect (stocks owned in the industry of the litigant party) personal financial interest.ResultsWe find that not recusing from a case where direct personal financial interests exist negatively affects institutional legitimacy, but indirect conflicts of interest show no effect on diffuse support. Additionally, ideological congruence between the public and justice involved in the scenario not only does not mitigate negative effects but rather enhances harm toward diffuse support.ConclusionNon‐recusals in cases where a justice has a direct financial conflict of interest negatively affect Court legitimacy.