Abstract
Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, no constitutional protection for intellectual property (IP) existed in the many earlier constitutions of Egypt or Tunisia. It is remarkable and surprising therefore that, in 2014, IP clauses appeared in the post-revolutionary constitutions of both countries. This raises the key question: why add to the existing regulation of IP in this way. Is constitutional protection just another example of the inexorable strengthening of IP rights (IPRs) or could it be a means of constraining them, where necessary, to protect other rights? This article argues that including IP in a constitution may, rather than merely strengthening IP owners' rights, open IPRs up to competition against more fundamental constitutionally protected human rights and, for example, support the prioritization of the right to health. This could be a valid explanation for and potential use of the inclusion of IP in the Egyptian and Tunisian Constitutions.