Every symmetric global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Every symmetric global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

Published:2011-12 Issue:6 Volume:47 Page:749-754
ISSN:0304-4068
Container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics

Author:

Basteck Christian,Daniëls Tijmen R.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Economics and Econometrics

Reference12 articles.

1. Basteck, C., Daniëls, T.R., Heinemann, F., 2010. Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. Revised Version of SFB Working Paper. Available at https://sites.google.com/site/tijmendaniels/Characterising.pdf.

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3. Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities;Frankel;Journal of Economic Theory,2003

4. Honda, J., 2011. Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric 3×3 example. Journal of Mathematical Economics (2011), ISSN 0304-4068, doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406811000590).

5. The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information;Kajii;Econometrica,1997

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