Explore emission reduction strategy and evolutionary mechanism under central environmental protection inspection system for multi-agent based on evolutionary game theory-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Explore emission reduction strategy and evolutionary mechanism under central environmental protection inspection system for multi-agent based on evolutionary game theory

Published:2020-04 Issue: Volume:156 Page:77-90
ISSN:0140-3664
Container-title:Computer Communications
language:en
Short-container-title:Computer Communications

Author:

Chong Dashuang,Sun Na

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Computer Networks and Communications

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