Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions

Published:2003-10 Issue:1 Volume:45 Page:38-72
ISSN:0899-8256
Container-title:Games and Economic Behavior
language:en
Short-container-title:Games and Economic Behavior

Author:

Battigalli Pierpaolo,Siniscalchi Marciano

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference24 articles.

1. Infinite-Dimensional Analysis;Aliprantis,1994

2. Battigalli, P., 1999. Rationalizability in incomplete-information games. Working paper ECO 99/17, European University Institute

3. Battigalli, P., Siniscalchi, M., 2000. Rationalizable bidding in general first-price auctions. Working paper IGIER–Università Bocconi. Latest version available at http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/siniscalchi

4. Rationalizable strategic behavior;Bernheim;Econometrica,1984

5. Chung, K.S., Ely, J., 2000. Efficient and dominance-Solvable auctions with interdependent valuations. CMS–EMS discussion paper No. 1313, Northwestern University

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