Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources

Published:2017-09 Issue: Volume:428 Page:76-86
ISSN:0022-5193
Container-title:Journal of Theoretical Biology
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Theoretical Biology

Author:

Lee Joung-Hun,Jusup Marko,Iwasa Yoh

Funder

Kyushu University

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,General Agricultural and Biological Sciences,General Immunology and Microbiology,General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology,Modeling and Simulation,General Medicine,Statistics and Probability

Reference52 articles.

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4. Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments;Bochet;J. Econ. Behav. Organ.,2006

5. The failure of environmental regulation in New York;Carter;Crime Law Soc. Change,1996

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