Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems

Published:2008-07 Issue:1-3 Volume:401 Page:96-106
ISSN:0304-3975
Container-title:Theoretical Computer Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Theoretical Computer Science

Author:

Brenner Janina,Schäfer Guido

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

General Computer Science,Theoretical Computer Science

Reference36 articles.

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