Corrupt behavior in public organizations: ethics, rationalization, and socialization for an integrated reading

Abstract

Corruption has been receiving an increasing attention by scholars and practitioners, also due to the growth of corrupt behaviors in both private and public organizations worldwide. Focusing the attention on public context, discretion is an unavoidable element of administrative action, which derives from the incompleteness of contracts and the information asymmetries that characterize every agency relationship. A further element of uncertainty within agency relationship is represented by subjective elements of those who commit fraudulent behaviors (rationalization) and by contextual elements that push for socialization and, therefore, acceptance by the group of such behaviors, by going to inhibit group control able to prevent its commission. Thus, the main problem arises of monitoring possible degenerations in administrative behavior. For this purpose, a combination of institutional and organizational strategies and ethical strategies could be interesting and desirable. This conceptual study provides an innovative and integrated reading of the corruption phenomenon through the lens of agency theory (AT) and organizational behavior (OB) approaches, where codes of ethics and codes of conduct play a crucial role as tools for guiding and controlling the behavior of public officials. The codes define a system of moral and reputational incentives, in addition to criminal and administrative sanctions, aimed at increasing the ethical capital of administrations and managing “gray areas” that are not adequately regulated. This chapter aims to provide an integrated framework, combining AT and OB approaches, to discuss such strategies related to ethical and social issues.