How to solve the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

Abstract

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (EA) highlighted shortcomings of its institutional framework – establishment of a monetary union without a central fiscal policy. Although the economic governance in the EA was substantially reformed in the aftermath of the crisis to address its weaknesses, further reforms including some elements of fiscal union are needed to increase resilience of the Economic and Monetary Union to shocks and prevent emergence of economic and financial distress in the future. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, the article analyses potential institutional reforms aimed at solving the sovereign debt crisis in the EA and indicates which proposals are desired and possible to implement. The research method used is a descriptive analysis of reforms proposed in the literature. In the article, the following reform proposals were assessed: the Debt Redemption Fund, European bonds, assigning the European Central Bank the role of the lender of last resort and a fiscal union with an EA fiscal capacity.