Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies

Abstract

We provide a unified language for studying power sharing in authoritarian regimes. Power-sharing deals entail not only sharing spoils between a ruler and challenger, but also establishing an enforcement mechanism. An arrangement does not truly share power without reallocating power to make it costly for the ruler to renege. Institutional concessions, such as delegating agenda control over policy decisions or empowering third-party enforcers, can reallocate power. However, weak institutions create a Catch-22 that inhibits credible commitment. When institutions are weak, self-enforcing power sharing is still possible if challengers have coercive means to defend their spoils. However, challengers can leverage their coercive capabilities to overthrow the ruler. This double-edged sword implies that a strategic dictator shares power only under specific conditions: challengers can credibly punish an autocratic ruler; if the ruler shares power, the challenger must willingly forgo taking harmful actions; and the ruler willingly acquiesces to diminished power and rents. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 26 is June 2023. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.