MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING

Published:2004-05-17 Issue:1 Volume:7 Page:409-435
ISSN:1094-2939
Container-title:Annual Review of Political Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

Author:

Cameron Charles¹,McCarty Nolan²

Affiliation:

1. Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10025;

2. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540;

Abstract

▪ Abstract Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto bargaining and some of its more interesting and useful extensions, focusing on one of the best developed applications, the presidential veto over legislation. One of the primary attractions of these models is that they often produce crisp, testable empirical predictions. Our review focuses on 18 such predictions. We conclude with a brief review of the empirical evidence related to these hypotheses.

Publisher

Annual Reviews

Subject

Sociology and Political Science

Link

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104810

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