Spoofing in aviation: Security threats on GPS and ADS-B systems

Abstract

Introduction/purpose: The paper provides a review of recent research in the field of GPS and ADS-B spoofing. Systems that rely on satellite positioning technology can be targeted by spoofing in order to generate incorrect positioning/timing, which is accomplished by inserting false signals into the "victim's" receiver. Attackers try to insert false positioning information into systems that, for example, provide navigation of airplanes or drones for the purpose of hijacking or distracting security/safety in airspace surveillance. New concepts of navigation and ATC will thus be necessary. Methods: Using a scientific approach, the paper gives an evaluation of GPS and ADS-B spoofing/antispoofing and how spoofing affects the cyber security of aviation systems. Results: Based on the methodological analysis used, the importance of studying spoofing/anti-spoofing in aviation is shown. Conclusion: Although spoofing in aviation is only a potential threat, its technical feasibility is realistic and its potential is considerable; it becomes more flexible and cheaper due to very rapid advancement of SDR technologies. The real risk, in the time to come, are potential spoofing attacks that could occur from the air, using drones. However, aircraft systems are not exposed to spoofing without any defense; receivers can detect it by applying various anti-spufing techniques. Also, pilots are able to detect and solve problems at every stage of the flight. However, due to a possibility of more sophisticated spoofing attacks, international organizations such as ICAO are proactively working to increase GPS and ADS-B systems robustness on spoofing.