Author:
Acheva Polina,Zaitsev Konstantin,Zavodilenko Vladimir,Losev Anton,Huang Anqi,Makarov Vadim
Abstract
AbstractAttacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector’s vulnerabilities against these attacks. We illustrate its performance by testing a free-running detector that includes a rudimentary countermeasure measuring an average photocurrent. While our testbench automatically finds the detector to be controllable in a continuous-blinding regime, the countermeasure registers photocurrent significantly exceeding that in a quantum regime, thus revealing the attack. We then perform manually a pulsed blinding attack, which controls the detector intermittently. This attack is missed by the countermeasure in a wide range of blinding pulse durations and powers, still allowing to eavesdrop the key. We make recommendations for improvement of both the testbench and countermeasure.
Funder
Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation
Russian Science Foundation
National Natural Science Foundation of China
National Key Research and Development Program of China
Research Fund Program of State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Condensed Matter Physics,Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics,Control and Systems Engineering
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