Affiliation:
1. London School of Economics
Abstract
Legal epistemology has been an area of great philosophical growth since the turn of the century. But recently, a number of philosophers have argued the entire project is misguided, claiming that it relies on an illicit transposition of the norms of individual epistemology to the legal arena. This paper uses these objections as a foil to consider the foundations of legal epistemology, particularly as it applies to the criminal law. The aim is to clarify the fundamental commitments of legal epistemology and suggest a way to vindicate it.
Publisher
University of Michigan Library
Subject
General Earth and Planetary Sciences,General Environmental Science
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