Affiliation:
1. Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet, Institut za filozofiju
Abstract
The text argues in favor of the thesis that inferential contextualism is the
most successful form of epistemic contextualism. To support this claim, the
opposing stance of conversational contextualism and the critique of the
inferential version of contextualism by Thomas Grundmann will be presented.
Conversational contextualism will be scrutinized through criticism from
Michael Williams, the foremost representative of inferential contextualism.
It will be claimed that Williams? criticisms expose the untenability of
conversational contextualism. Subsequently, Grundmann?s critique of
Williams? inferential contextualism, asserting that Williams?s position
implies epistemic realism, will be examined. Ultimately, it will be
demonstrated that Grundmann?s critique does not undermine Williams?s theory.
The externalism that Grundmann associates with epistemic realism is argued
not to align with the externalism within the framework of Williams?s
inferential contextualism. In conclusion, it will be asserted that
inferential contextualism emerges as the most plausible version of this
position.
Publisher
National Library of Serbia
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