Mirror, mirror on the wall …: modelling the US Congress as an internal labour market

Abstract

Almost one third of all who served in the US Senate between 1943 and 2020 ascended to their positions in that legislative body directly from the US House of Representatives. Thus, we model the legislative branch of the US government as an internal labour market, wherein members of the lower chamber seek ‘promotion’ (that is, election) to positions in the more prestigious upper chamber. This process includes the possibility that some US representatives are being promoted to positions in the Senate for which they are not competent, a situation referred to as the Peter Principle. Another possibility is that the ‘most ineffective’ US representatives are using this internal labour market to attain promotion to the Senate, an outcome that is referred to as the Dilbert Principle. Gallup polling data on the job approval by the public of the US Congress, along with absenteeism data on members of the US Senate, support both possibilities from our formal model.