Game Paradigm for Wired Networks

Abstract

There are a great number of situations in which a many agent system self-organizes by coordinating individual actions. Such coordination is usually achieved by agents with partial information about the system, and in some cases optimizing utility functions that conflict with each other. A similar situation is found in many network situations. An example of a frustrated multi-agent system is given by the evolutionary minority game in which many players have to make a binary choice and the winning option is the one made by the minority. In evolutionary minority game, players make decisions by evaluating the performance of their strategies from past experience, and hence, they can adapt. The players have access to global information, which is in turn generated by the actions of the agents themselves. As the game progresses, non-trivial fluctuations arise in the agents' collective decisions – these can be understood in terms of the dynamical formation of crowds consisting of agents using correlated strategies. This chapter explores the game paradigm for wired networks.