Abstract
North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balance of insecurity, where the weaker North Korean side faced South Korea and the combined ROK–US forces. The second set was intended to shift the balance of insecurity into an imbalance of terror while ensuring that only Pyongyang would be armed with nuclear weapons in the area. The “gray zone” discourse of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (rather than North Korea) ended up bolstering North Korea’s nuclear program, while South Korea intensified only its conventional weapons program.
Publisher
University of California Press
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Geography, Planning and Development
Reference99 articles.
1. Bug-han-ui gug-ji gun-sa-do-bal-e dae-han jaeng-jeom-gwa jeong-chaeg-bang-hyang” [Issues and new approaches to North Korean local provocations];Journal of Strategic Studies,2012
2. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.;International Security,2001
3. Limits of Engagement? The Sunshine Policy, Nuclear Tests, and South Korean Views of North Korea 1995-2013;International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,2020
4. Ban, Kil Joo. 2011. The Reliable Promise of Middle Power Fighters: The ROK Military’s COIN Success in Vietnam and Iraq. PhD dissertation, Arizona State University.
5. Just War and Just Battle: The Examination of North Korea’s Attack against the ROKS Cheonan Based on the Just War Principles;Central European Journal of International and Security Studies,2021