Influence of heterogeneous environmental regulation policies on the strategy of pollutant discharge for enterprise: an evolutionary game approach

Abstract

Abstract To improve the effectiveness of the government’s environmental regulation policy, this study aims to solve the problem of the low willingness of enterprises to cooperate. This study redefined and defined the types of environmental regulations based on the policy realization path, and gradually added them into the game system between the government and enterprises, using the evolutionary game to analyze the impact of different regulatory means on the enterprises’ choice of whether or not to cooperate with the regulatory policy, and using MATLAB to perform a numerical simulation to compare the degree of impact. In this way, the best regulatory objects of different regulatory means were determined, and the theoretical basis and practical reference for the government to implement classified governance policies were provided. In addition, this study for the first-time classified enterprises based on the relationship between the number of pollutants discharged by enterprises and the government’s pollutant discharge quota, and incorporated them into the model for further research. The results showed that the government should implement administrative regulations for enterprises discharging a small number of pollutants; implement a combination of administrative and market-oriented regulations for enterprises discharging a medium number of pollutants; implement administrative, market-oriented, and socialized regulations at the same time for enterprises discharging a large number of pollutants. Moreover, these should be based on the premise of reasonably arranging the performance appraisal of local governments.